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Abstract 
Dembroff’s “Escaping the natural attitude about gender” replies to my “Are women adult human 
females?”. This paper responds to Dembroff’s numerous criticisms of my arguments, as well as 
to the charge that “Are women…” is “fundamentally is an unscholarly attempt to vindicate a 
political slogan that is currently being used to undermine civic rights and respect for trans 
persons”. I argue that Dembroff’s criticisms fail without exception, and explain why the claims 
about my motives are baseless. 
 
 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither 
more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words 
mean so many different things.” 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass 
 
It will come as no surprise to those who have been following the recent turmoil in philosophy 
over sex and gender (Bermudez et al. 2019, Alcoff et al. 2019) that “Are women adult human 
females?” (Byrne Forthcoming; henceforth WAHF) was not a hit with a number of anonymous 
referees. For example, the report of “Referee 1” for a top journal read in its entirety as follows: 
This paper should not be accepted. The arguments given in favour of the 
author’s view are question-begging. The alternative views discussed have ways 
of accommodating the data that the author takes to count in favour of their 
view. The author fails completely to discuss these. The responses to objections 
are inadequate. In general, the discussion of alternative views is highly 
uncharitable and ill-informed. 
Since Referee 1 was rather short on specifics, naturally I wondered what, exactly, WAHF’s 
grave failings were supposed to be. I am therefore genuinely grateful to Dembroff for attempting 
to fill in the details. 
“Escaping the natural attitude about gender” (Dembroff Forthcoming-b; henceforth ENAG) is 
trenchant, to put it mildly. Dembroff’s reply convicts me of “rhetorical bullying” (8), of using 
“cherry-picked quotations to undermine the legitimacy of queer communities” (13), of deploying 
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“uninformed and poorly constructed” arguments (19), and much else besides. WAHF is 
unmasked as a Trojan Horse, “fundamentally an unscholarly attempt to vindicate a political 
slogan that is currently being used to undermine civic rights and respect for trans persons” (20).  
Let us start with the least inflammatory of these accusations, my poorly constructed 
arguments which “are at best confused— more often, they are question-begging or false” (3).  
1. The preliminary case for AHF 
The main thesis of WAHF is this: 
AHF  S is a woman iff S is an adult human female,  
where the biconditional is understood to be universally quantified and necessitated. Since 
“categories” in WAHF are taken to be properties modally individuated, AHF is equivalent to the 
thesis that the category woman and the category adult human female are identical. An additional 
thesis is that the category adult human female is “biological (and not social)” (3), something that 
Dembroff also questions and which I will take up later. 
ENAG makes unnecessarily heavy weather of establishing that my thesis “must be one about 
identity” (4), as if what I said was somehow unclear. Dembroff incorrectly claims that I 
“disagree” with metaphysicians who hold that “necessary equivalence is importantly distinct 
from identity”; all I say is that “It will do no harm to individuate categories modally: necessarily 
equivalent categories are identical” (emphasis added, this is quoted in ENAG: 3, fn. 11). As 
WAHF notes, the relevant arguments do not turn on hyperintensional differences. 
WAHF also makes some other clarificatory points, including: 
…the evidence relevant to assessing AHF should not be sought in the 
“ordinary use” of ‘woman’ and the like: a mistaken conception (for instance) 
can lead people to systematically misapply words. Having said that, there is 
nothing wrong with appealing to linguistic evidence that clearly bears on the 
meaning (or intension) of ‘woman’, since that has immediate implications for 
AHF via disquotational principles. (No doubt there is some connection 
between ordinary use and meaning, but it is highly indirect and not well 
understood.) A simpler sort of evidence comprises facts about where the 
women are in various actual and counterfactual situations….In what follows, 
appeal will be made to evidence of both sorts. (3, last emphasis added) 
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And: 
Naturally such appeals can be disputed. People vary in their abilities to 
correctly identify members of categories, or to correctly apply words…It can 
be tempting to respond to such disagreement by losing one’s nerve and 
retreating to the claim that one’s evidence really consists in neutrally 
characterized facts about speakers’ use of words, or (perhaps worse) facts 
about “intuitions”—evidence that one’s opponents are less likely to challenge. 
That temptation should be resisted. (3, last emphasis added) 
The evidence I intend to adduce in favor of AHF, then, includes (a) linguistic facts that clearly 
bear on the meaning of ‘woman’ and (b) non-linguistic facts about women. That evidence does 
not include facts about “intuitions” or the “ordinary use” of words. 
 Section 2 of WAHF gives six (non-demonstrative) arguments in support of AHF, three 
employing an (a)-type premise (e.g. that there’s a robust cross-linguistic pattern of gendered 
words for the adult male and female forms of certain animals), and three employing a (b)-type 
premise (e.g. that the journalist Norah Vincent’s attempt to infiltrate groups of men had no effect 
on her status as a woman). The point of these arguments is to reinforce Bettcher’s remark that 
“On the face of it, the definition “female, adult, human being” really does seem right. Indeed, it 
seems as perfect a definition as one might have ever wanted” (Bettcher 2009: 105; quoted in 
WAHF: 9). The onus is thus on AHF’s opponents—hardly an implausible result. Most of the 
action is in section 3, where I attempt to rebut the main arguments against AHF, due to Bettcher 
and Stoljar.1 The case for AHF is not complete until the end of that section. 
 According to Dembroff, however, I have mischaracterized section 2 of my paper. ENAG 
interprets me as offering six considerations in support of a semantic claim, that “the 
philosophically relevant meaning of ‘woman’ refers to adult human female.” What’s worse, 
despite my official disavowal of “ordinary usage” and “intuitions”, all my arguments are said to 
“entirely rely on particular, everyday uses of ‘woman’ and ‘girl’” (3, fn. 9), accompanied by 
“linguistic intuitions” (4, fn. 13).2  
 
1 WAHF briefly discusses other arguments in footnotes (10, fn. 15 and 16). For a deeper examination of some of 
these and more, including Bettcher on ‘womanly’ (ENAG: 7, fn. 24), see Bogardus Forthcoming. 
2 It might be helpful to contrast the actual argument of WAHF with Dembroff’s reconstruction. WAHF: here are six 
arguments that jointly make AHF “of considerably greater initial appeal than the JTB analysis of knowledge” (8); 
none of the leading objections work; hence AHF is true (or is at least a very plausible hypothesis) and (assumed with 
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 First, Dembroff’s claim that WAHF assumes that “there is one meaning of ‘woman’ relevant 
for philosophical inquiry” (2) is incorrect. WAHF simply engages with the many writers in the 
feminist tradition who at least seem to be using the word ‘woman’ in the same standard everyday 
sense, whatever that is, and who are asking questions and propounding theories using that word. 
I am joining their conversation, and my use of ‘woman’ is supposed to be interpreted in the same 
way as theirs. (I shall return to this issue at greater length later.) Perhaps there are other senses of 
‘woman’ that are more “relevant for philosophical inquiry”—WAHF takes no stand on this 
point. 
 Second, why does Dembroff think that all of my arguments rely on linguistic evidence? Take 
Norah Vincent’s convincing attempt to live as a man. The relevant evidence is this: 
…Vincent did not become a man. As it happens, she made some serious 
attempts to transform her body by weightlifting and eating lots of protein, but 
even if her preparations had included testosterone supplements, she would 
have remained a woman. Imagine that, due to misreading Judith Butler, 
Vincent became convinced (and perhaps alarmed) for a few months during her 
fieldwork that her performance as a man made her one. If that had happened, 
she would have been wrong. (WAHF: 7) 
 AHF, if true, straightforwardly explains this evidence, and is thereby supported by it—although, 
of course, not conclusively. The cumulative effect of the six considerations is intended to 
establish AHF as the default hypothesis. 
 On the face of it, the premise of the Vincent argument does not concern “everyday uses” of 
words. Dembroff sees that I “might protest” at this point, and replies in a footnote that the 
argument appeals “to what are stipulated as “correct” descriptions of persons as falling under the 
term ‘women’” (4, fn. 13). This is incorrect. Nothing is said about the word ‘woman’. Nor, for 
that matter, is anything stipulated. The relevant piece of evidence is that Vincent remained a 
woman.3 This does have linguistic consequences, for instance that the English sentence ‘Vincent 
 
almost no argument) woman is a biological and not social category. This bears very little relation to the 
“reconstruction” (ENAG: 2-3). That has six premises, and I only accept premise 4 (“Adult human female is a 
biological and not social category”) and premise 3 (“On the “standard” meaning of ‘woman’, ‘woman’ refers to the 
category adult human female”). However, premise 3 is not a premise of the argument in WAHF. See section 3 
below. 
3 And also would have remained one if she had taken testosterone or misread Butler. 
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remained a woman’ and the German sentence ‘Vincent blieb eine Frau’ are both true. But the 
evidence itself is not about the word ‘woman’ at all. 
 Pace Dembroff, it isn’t true that my allegedly non-linguistic arguments are really hidden 
linguistic ones. What about ENAG’s charge that my linguistic arguments, at least, have premises 
about “ordinary usage”, despite my statement to the contrary? By the “ordinary use” of a word I 
meant ordinary speakers’ dispositions to apply the word. (An imprecise characterization, of 
course, but further precision was unnecessary.) As the quotation from WAHF notes, speakers can 
be disposed to systematically misapply words, and so there is no straightforward route from 
ordinary use, conceived in this neutral fashion, to meaning.4 None of the linguistic arguments 
employ a premise about ordinary use in this sense. But don’t dictionaries record (or attempt to 
record) “ordinary use”? Only in the sense that they record (or attempt to record) what words 
ordinarily mean—this is not “ordinary use” as it figures in WAHF. 
 Perhaps WAHF should have belabored these ground-clearing issues. In any case, the origin 
of Dembroff’s misunderstanding is clear. It is my use of quotations from the New York Times, 
the subtitle of Vincent’s book (‘One Woman’s Year Disguised as a Man’), and so forth: 
Byrne also appeals to Timothy Williamson, The New York Times, a 2010 
Pourriat film, a 2003 Vincent memoir, and a carefully chosen quotation from a 
trans author, Julia Serano. (ENAG: 7)  
Now I myself see nothing wrong with appealing to Williamson, in particular.5 However, WAHF 
does not appeal to Williamson, or the NYT, or any of these other sources. Take the NYT, which 
Dembroff says I appeal to “multiple times” (ENAG: 6). (The NYT is mentioned twice.) Here’s 
how WAHF uses the NYT, in connection with Pourriat’s film Majorité Opprimée: 
As the New York Times (correctly) puts it, “the parent doing the chores is a 
man, and all the gender roles are reversed, creating a world in which men 
confront what it would be like to face the daily indignities, compromises and 
risks that women often face” …This is exactly as predicted by AHF: in the 
 
4 For a sophisticated attempt to give a “use” theory of meaning, see Horwich 2005. 
5 Since I have the opportunity: 
Consider, for example, the statement ‘If Eve is a woman then Eve is an adult’, when Eve is a female human 
on the borderline of adulthood. The statement is clearly true; a woman is an adult female human. 
(Williamson 1994: 145) 
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fictional world of the film, the occupants of the female gender roles are adult 
human males. (WAHF: 7) 
ENAG appears to interpret this passage as saying: the NYT has printed and endorsed ‘the parent 
doing the chores is a man’, so this supports the view that ‘man’, as used by the NYT, applies to 
an adult human male occupying a female gender role. But, as signified by the parenthetical 
‘correctly’, the passage is actually saying something quite different, namely: (in the fictional 
world) the parent doing the chores is a man, which is exactly as predicted by AHF; by the way, 
the NYT agrees. WAHF uses a parallel construction for the second NYT quotation. The main 
point of these quotations is to reassure the reader—if reassurance is needed—that my own 
opinions are not idiosyncratic. Notice “what is predicted” by AHF is that the parent doing the 
chores is a man; AHF does not predict what may or may not appear in newspapers. The crucial 
piece of evidence is therefore that the parent doing the chores is a man, not that some journalist 
has written a sentence to that effect.  
2. Dembroff’s objections 
Having hopefully cleared all that up, where do the six arguments of section 2 go wrong? Here are 
their respective premises, concisely put: 
P1. The dictionary definition of ‘woman’ is ‘adult human female’. 
P2. There are many gendered animal words which refer to adult females/males. 
P3. We know that Mitochondrial Eve is a woman/We know that Y-chromosomal Adam 
is not a woman. 
P4. When a human female is born, it is almost invariably known by inspection that the 
baby is female and that she is a girl. 
P5. In Majorité Opprimée the males who occupy female gender roles are men/Norah 
Vincent remained a woman.  
P6. ‘Woman’ and ‘female’ are appropriately used as stylistic variants in certain 
contexts. 
For each one, we can ask both: Is Dembroff denying the premise? Is Dembroff denying that the 
premise lends support to AHF?  
With respect to P1, Dembroff seems to be skeptical that the dictionary definition is evidence 
of anything: 
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Byrne claims that “the dictionary” definition provides evidence that ‘woman’ 
means ‘adult human female’. Let’s set aside problems with using the 
dictionary to do philosophy of language. (ENAG: 7; footnote omitted)6 
The main objection, though, is that “‘woman’ may have multiple meanings” (6). Waiving 
“problems with using the dictionary”, “Even dictionaries list multiple meanings for ‘woman’” 
(7). Indeed they do. This would be highly relevant if the ‘adult human female’ entry was not the 
first, or was marked ‘Obs.’ or something like that. But it is the first. Unless dictionaries are 
completely useless as guides to the meanings of words, it must be admitted that P1 provides 
some support for AHF. As WAHF takes pains to point out, this is not decisive, but it is a 
consideration nonetheless.7,8 
 ENAG offers no comment on P2, about the prevalence of pairs like ‘goose’ and ‘gander’.9 
On P3, about the Adam and Eve of human genetics, ENAG says “supporting the sufficiency 
direction of AHF [that being an adult human female is sufficient for being woman] is highly 
uninformative” (4, fn. 13), seemingly on the ground that a similar argument would support the 
view that being a lesbian or a wife is sufficient for being a woman. If there is an objection here, it 
is not apparent. In any event, ENAG ignores Y-chromosomal Adam, who is exhumed to support 
the necessity direction.  
 With respect to P4, the problem, according to ENAG, is that the argument: 
 
6 Also: “Byrne even suggests we will find this meaning in the pages of a dictionary” (ENAG: 5, emphasis added), as 
if this is hopelessly naïve. 
7 P1 provides support for both parts of the overall conclusion: “dictionaries are hard to reconcile with the idea that 
woman is a social category. A natural alternative is that the category is biological, and the dictionary entry ‘adult 
human female’ is at least a promising suggestion” (WAHF: 5).  
8 Dembroff notes that Merriam-Websters “lists six” definitions of ‘woman’. The first is “an adult female person”, 
but Dembroff highlights one of the others: “distinctively feminine nature” (ENAG: 7, fn. 24). Examples of that 
sense from the Oxford English Dictionary are sentences like ‘She knew that all the woman in her somewhat 
masculine nature had gone out, in maternal affection to her husband’s nephew’. This—I would hope!— is not the 
relevant sense of ‘woman’ (see the following section). ENAG does not mention that the remaining four subsidiary 
definitions are: “womankind”, “a woman who is a servant”, “wife/mistress/girlfriend”, and “a woman who is 
extremely fond of or devoted to something specified”, as in ‘I’m a chocolate woman through and through’. 
‘Woman’ as used in the second and fourth definitions clearly has its primary sense. 
Later Dembroff attaches some importance to the fact that one sense of ‘girl’ is (as the OED has it), a “woman of 
any age” (ENAG: 8-9). (Another sense is “young woman”.) Why this is relevant eludes me. ‘Girl’ in WAHF has the 
sense it has in ‘women and girls’. Dembroff also wonders why my so-called “semantic inquiry” does not extend to 
‘lady’, ‘miss’, ‘widow’, ‘tomboy’, ‘lesbian’, etc. (8). Here I am just following the literature I engage with—which 
generally doesn’t even use ‘girl’, instead focusing rather myopically on ‘woman’. 
9 There is plenty to be said. For a good start, see Smith 2019. 
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…simply stipulates that a female-assigned baby is “known” to be a girl. If this 
argument has more content than the claim that people use the term ‘girl’ to 
describe female-assigned babies, I couldn’t find it. (4) 
This is another of ENAG’s peculiar uses of ‘stipulation’. Claims are made, which Dembroff is 
free to dispute, but nothing is stipulated.10 Neither does WAHF say anything about “female-
assigned babies”; despite P4 standing in plain sight, ENAG distorts it. And why the scare quotes 
around ‘known’? It’s hard to be sure, but it looks like Dembroff does not accept P4. Why? If 
support for P4 is needed, one can find it in the knowledge norm of assertion (Williamson 2000: 
ch. 7): in typical cases, there is nothing wrong with asserting that the mewling baby is a girl, or 
that she is female. 
 With respect to P5, about swapped gender roles, ENAG repeats the incorrect complaint that 
the premise is “stipulated”, and alleges that the argument appeals to “intuition pumps about what 
counterfactual statements “ordinary” people (people who share Byrne’s linguistic intuitions?) 
would assent to” (4, fn. 13). This is also incorrect: there is no such premise about “ordinary 
people”.  
 Finally, with respect to P6, the problem seems to be that my quotation from Serano was 
“carefully chosen” (7). Perhaps some other quotation from Serano illustrates how she sometimes 
does not use ‘woman’ and ‘female’ as stylistic variants in a context where other people would. It 
is rather unlikely that this is true (see Serano 2017), but it is any case irrelevant. The premise is 
that it is appropriate to so use these terms; the premise is not that Serano in fact uses ‘woman’ 
and ‘female’ that way.11 
 WAHF predicts “[p]ointless charges of “begging the question”” (3; probably an effect of 
Referee 1’s report). Undeterred, Dembroff insists that my arguments do indeed beg the question 
(ENAG: 3, 8). Given the explicit prediction, one would have hoped that ENAG would carefully 
spell out why. Unfortunately it does not. I can only presume that the following observation 
applies here: 
 
10 More carefully, WAHF does have one hypothetical case which can fairly be said to be “stipulated” (11). But this 
is the entirely innocuous sense in which Gettier’s hypothetical cases are stipulated. 
11 So when Dembroff remarks in a footnote that “one of Byrne’s six arguments in favor of AHF…is that ‘woman’ 
and ‘female’ are used interchangeably” (ENAG: 9, fn. 30), this is incorrect. 
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Sometimes philosophers lapse into a use of ‘begging the question’ that sheds 
no lights whatsoever on a debate, teetering on the most pointless use whereby 
one automatically classifies an argument against a position as question begging 
when its premises support an unwelcome conclusion. (Cappelen and 
Hawthorne 2011: 464) 
ENAG’s objections to the six considerations dissolve on closer examination; if they are the best 
on offer, the preliminary case for AHF looks stronger than ever. 
ENAG contains a couple of other objections which it will be helpful to examine at this point.   
The objections are not directed to any specific argument, but rather to WAHF’s conclusion. They 
focus on AHF’s ‘adult’ part, and the ‘juvenile’ part of its counterpart for girls: 
JHF  S is a girl iff S is a juvenile human female. (WAHF: 6) 
The first objection is that “the most charitable version” of my view draws the line between 
juvenile and adult at “a point of physical maturity associated with being impregnatable”, and this 
is too early: “‘Woman’ is rarely used to describe pubescent adolescents, such as fifteen- and 
sixteen-year-olds” (ENAG: 8). (‘Ugly’ is rarely used to describe the ugly; the objection should 
rather be: ‘Woman’ does not apply to pubescent adolescents.) Dembroff is raising some pertinent 
questions. When does juvenility shade off into adulthood? (Of course both ‘juvenile’ and ‘adult’ 
are vague, as is ‘woman’.) And does ‘adult’ capture the developmental stage at which one 
becomes a woman?  
On the first question, human females have fully matured into the adult form at the end of 
puberty, which is around 15 or 16. AHF is thus false if these people are not women. But it is 
hardly clear that they are not: ‘They are young women’ seems unexceptionable. However, for the 
sake of the argument, let us grant that these young adult females aren’t women; the answer to the 
second question therefore is ‘no’. To repair AHF, ‘adult’ needs to be restricted to remove those 
in the very early stages of adulthood. That would not affect the basic claims of WAHF in any 
way. The paper anticipates worries of exactly this kind: “one should be wary of claiming that 
AHF is more than a very good approximation” (WAHF: 3).12 
 
12 Other examples include precocious puberty and older females with absent puberty. Questions also arise about 
‘human’ in the statement of AHF. Similar terms for female animals sometimes cut across species boundaries: a 
female hawk is a hen, but hawks come in many different species. Modern humans interbred with Neanderthals, 
 10 
Dembroff’s second objection is not against AHF, but instead is directed to the second part of 
my conclusion, that woman is not a social category. The problem is said to be that “Even with 
respect to ordinary language, such as the proliferation of terms like ‘adulting’, it seems clear that 
“adult” is very much a social category” (ENAG: 15). And if ‘adult’ in the statement of AHF 
means something like ‘legally/socially an adult’, then if AHF is true, woman is a social category. 
But I trust it is clear that ‘adult’ in the statement of AHF is supposed to be interpreted as in ‘adult 
chimpanzee’ and the like; that is also the natural interpretation of ‘adult’ in the dictionary entry 
for ‘woman’. Other senses of ‘adult’ are irrelevant. 
3.  Multiple meanings 
Since ENAG devotes so much space to emphasizing that my “philosophically naive framing” (5) 
short-changes polysemous and contextualist accounts of ‘woman’, the issue needs exploring 
more thoroughly. 
 As Dembroff notes, WAHF does mention both polysemy/ambiguity and contextualism. I 
criticize Saul’s contextualist proposal (which she does not actually endorse) in a footnote. 
Dembroff hyperbolically asserts that my criticism of Saul “displays a startlingly uncharitable 
reading” (ENAG: 5, fn. 13, emphasis added), but set that aside.13 In another footnote I briefly 
argue against Stone’s suggestion that ‘woman’ is ambiguous/polysemous between an “adult 
human female” reading and a social “gender” reading (WAHF: 8, fn. 12). The same argument 
counts against the view that the polysemy in ‘woman’ is even more extensive, although ENAG 
does not notice it. 
In yet another footnote I examine Bettcher’s “multiple-meaning position”, on which 
‘woman’, in addition its standard or “dominant” meaning, also has a “resistant” meaning in the 
idiolects of some “trans subcultures”. According to ENAG, my response: 
 
usually regarded as a different species. Were these matings between (for instance) men who were humans and 
women who were Neanderthals, or merely between men and adult female Neanderthals? The answer is not clear.  
It may be that any reductive thesis along the lines of AHF remains no more than a close approximation—cf. 
WAHF on Women First! (8). Antony Forthcoming is a clear defense of Women Firstism, with Antony’s version not 
conceding that woman entails female (see also Mikkola 2001: 90-3, Moi 2015: 202). If reductionism fails, that need 
not spoil the project of WAHF, because a good case can be made that woman is a non-social category without 
appealing to a reductive analysis. (On the relative importance of ‘non-social’ and ‘biological’, see section 7 below.) 
13 That footnote of ENAG inaccurately paraphrases my “cursory arguments” against Saul. It also cites Jenkins and 
Bettcher as potential replies to one of my objections, about circularity; for critical discussion see Bogardus 2020.  
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…is to dismiss this as irrelevant to philosophical inquiry. Even if there are 
multiple meanings of gender terms, Byrne asserts, the meaning “clearly in play 
in the relevant literature” is the “dominant” meaning. By “dominant” meaning, 
it is safe to presume that Byrne means a meaning that best accords with their 
own linguistic intuitions—as well as dominant power structures. (6)14 
This is incorrect. First, I do not dismiss Bettcher’s “resistant” interpretation as irrelevant to 
philosophical inquiry. (I touched on this point earlier, in section 1.) In fact, if she is right, I 
would think it quite interesting to examine the resistant interpretation further. (I do give reasons 
for doubting that there is such an interpretation, however.) Second, the ‘dominant’ terminology is 
Bettcher’s, not mine, and it is “safe to presume” only that I mean whatever she does. The 
resistant meaning of ‘woman’ is simply its meaning “as deployed in trans subcultures” (Bettcher 
2013: 243); the dominant meaning is then the word’s meaning as deployed in mainstream 
culture. The ENAG passage continues: 
But, in that case, Byrne’s claim that [the dominant meaning is] at play in the 
“relevant literature” is puzzling. I cannot help but wonder why work by the 
central figures of the philosophical literature, not to mention work by 
anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists, is “irrelevant”, and where this 
elusive “relevant literature” is to be found. (6) 
The Bettcher footnote is appended to a passage which cites a considerable number of feminist 
writers from the 1970s and later. The preceding paragraph mentions three contemporary feminist 
philosophers, Jenkins, Stoljar and Saul. The word ‘woman’ frequently figures in the writings of 
these many feminists. They evidently intend to be using ‘woman’ to discuss a common subject 
matter, and freely quote one another using the word. They appear to have many “simple 
disagreements” (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2011: 452) about women: there is a single proposition 
expressed using the word ‘woman’, which one party believes and the other does not.15  
Take, for instance, Spelman’s canonical Inessential Woman (1988). Spelman quotes many 
authors on the topic of women, and critically examines what they say. Some are not feminist 
philosophers, like Aristotle and Kant. Some are not philosophers, like the sociologist Nancy 
 
14 See also ““Dominant” uses of gender terms—by which I take Byrne to mean…” (ENAG: 6). 
15 ‘Not believe’ should be read as including suspension of belief, not just disbelief. For present purposes, a “simple 
disagreement” is really a “simple non-agreement”.  
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Chodorow and the travel writer Jan Morris. Spelman even discusses a New York Times article 
that uses the word ‘woman’.16 As Mikkola puts it, Spelman argues against “the view that woman 
have some feature (definitive of ‘womanness’) in common and this feature is what makes them 
women” (Mikkola 2001: 77); according to Mikkola, Spelman’s “case against it is inadequate” 
(79). Mikkola and Spelman appear to have a simple disagreement over the negation of the thesis 
named by the penultimate quotation: Spelman believes it, and Mikkola does not. They are not 
talking past each other, or using ‘woman’ in some specialized technical sense.17 This is one 
example of the “relevant literature” that Dembroff finds “elusive”. 
Dembroff incorrectly claims that my argument “proceeds with the unargued-for assumption 
that there is one, unvarying answer to the question What does the word ‘woman’ mean?” 
(ENAG: 5). Rather, a working assumption of WAHF is that ‘woman’ has a standard 
interpretation in the literature I am discussing, and that it is an interpretation that the word has in 
many everyday contexts. This is completely compatible with polysemy of the kind recorded in 
the Oxford English Dictionary, and even with a mild form of contextualism. Protesting that this 
assumption is unwarranted would be to indict swathes of classic feminist philosophy. 
Still, Dembroff does seem to want to defend the radical polysemy view, that ‘woman’ has 
multiple meanings in everyday contexts, outside the gender studies seminar room, with no single 
meaning being clearly “dominant” (cf. Dembroff Forthcoming-c). In support of this, ENAG 
quotes a passage from Barnes, in which she speculates that “teenagers probably mean something 
quite a bit different” by their “gender terms” than do their grandparents and even other teenagers 
(Barnes 2019: 9; quoted in ENAG: 6). Teenagers have their own argot, of course. If your teen is 
inviting someone over for “Netflix and chill” that is not as innocent as it sounds. And “gender 
terms”, for Barnes, include not just ‘woman’ and ‘man’ but also the voguish ‘pangender’, 
‘genderfluid’, ‘genderqueer’ and the like (Barnes 2019: 7, 20). Doubtless a number of especially 
benighted grandparents don’t even understand these words. But what about ‘woman’? If some 
teenage idiolects attach a deviant meaning to the word, this shows nothing about ‘woman’ as 
used in everyday adult conversation and writing. Also, it is not remotely credible that teenagers 
do not understand the word ‘woman’ as used by their parents and schoolteachers, and as it 
 
16 Spelman is sensitive to the possibility of ambiguity, and argues that Plato “uses “woman” ambiguously” (1988: 
32-4). 
17 Not that this never happens (see WAHF: 9, fn. 13). 
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appears in Sojourner Truth’s speech “Ain’t I a Woman?” They have that word with its usual 
meaning in their lexicon too, and can use it when the grown-ups are around. 
The only other piece of evidence that Dembroff adduces for the radical polysemy view is that 
there are “endless examples” from “law, print media, social media, policy documents, and 
education, where ‘woman’ is used with meanings other than adult human female” (ENAG: 7). 
From these endless examples ENAG selects a couple of sentences from newspapers about 
transgender women (7, fn. 22). No explanation is given of why ‘woman’ in these sentences does 
not denote adult human female. Perhaps Dembroff thinks that if it does, both sentences are false 
because transgender women are not female, and charity dictates a true interpretation. (Given 
ENAG’s later discussion of sex, this hypothesis may not be right: see section 7 below.) In any 
case, the obvious problem is that there is no indication that the sense of ‘woman’ in these 
sentences is different from its sense on other pages of the newspaper, whatever that sense might 
be.  
Take Dembroff’s second example, which is from a series of articles in the UK newspaper 
The Daily Telegraph, chronicling the journalist David Thomas’s transition to Diana. The 
quotation is from the lede to the series, and we may safely assume that Thomas and the lede 
writer are using ‘woman’ with the same sense. At one point Thomas writes: 
Women, in particular, are being told that childbirth and menstruation, the most 
quintessentially, definitively female experiences are no longer reserved for 
women. In fact, it is offensive to say so. They are also expected to welcome 
anyone who says they are female into female-only environments. 
These demands are not being made by all transgender people. Many of 
us—I would guess the majority—are appalled by the aggression and 
unreasonableness of people who claim to speak in our name. And we are 
horrified by the totally counter-productive, but entirely predictable outcomes 
of their stridency. (Thomas 2019a) 
The reader can only presume that Thomas is using ‘women’ with whatever meaning it has in an 
ordinary context in which transgender issues are not salient. Similarly, when Thomas writes in 
the first article, “do I actually think that I am a woman? No, I don’t. I may become one in time, 
but not yet” (Thomas 2019b), and later when a fellow journalist writes in a coda to the series, “It 
has to be said that the woman I encounter today is a world away from the man I knew during a 
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period in the 1990s when, as journalists, we would frequently find ourselves writing on opposite 
sides of the gender divide” (Gordon 2020). Unless the Telegraph’s series is basically 
unintelligible, the word ‘woman’ has a single and common meaning throughout. 
4. A polysemy puzzle  
ENAG’s apparent endorsement of the radical polysemy view leads to a puzzle. If ‘woman’ has a 
variety of different meanings in newspapers and the like, shouldn’t one of these meanings 
correspond to the category adult human female? Why wouldn’t it? And if that is one meaning of 
‘woman’, then the palm should be awarded to Stone, who said years ago that “in everyday 
language ‘woman’…is ambiguous between sex and gender” (Stone 2007: 141; see WAHF: 8, fn. 
12); that is, ‘woman’ is ambiguous between an adult human female interpretation and a social 
“gender” interpretation. On the radical polysemy view, Stone’s only mistake was to think that 
there were two “dominant” or mainstream meanings—in fact, there are many more. Further, if 
this is right, then WAHF is not completely wrong either. It manages to be closer to the truth than 
Bettcher 2013 and Stoljar 1995, which hold that there is no dominant meaning of ‘woman’ on 
which it denotes the category adult human female. 
 There is some indication that Dembroff agrees that on one dominant meaning of ‘woman’, it 
does denote adult human female. There is the quotation in the previous section, “…is used with 
meanings other than adult human female””, which suggests that ‘woman’ is sometimes used with 
that meaning. And, according to ENAG, there is “evidence that, in certain contexts and 
communities, these terms [e.g. ‘woman’] take on meanings that entail or include physiological 
features” (6). (No evidence is cited, however.18) And finally, the extreme version of the principle 
of charity that apparently leads Dembroff to conclude that there are “endless” examples where 
“‘woman’ is used with meanings other than adult human female” could be used equally 
effectively to argue that there are endless examples where ‘woman’ does mean that. 
 But it is very hard to see how this interpretation could be correct. If ‘woman’ has a 
“dominant” interpretation on which it denotes adult human female, then of course ENAG should 
have simply said so and cited Stone, which it does not. Moreover, this would imply that my 
 
18 Barnes gives a concrete example of such “physiological features”, when she imagines being in “a context where 
everyone is using the term ‘man’ in a way that only applies to people born with a penis and testicles” (Barnes 2019). 
But it is very doubtful that there are any such contexts. If I say ‘All men are born with a penis and testicles’, and 
someone mentions penile agenesis (where a male baby is born without a penis), the right response is never to double 
down and insist that, nevertheless, my original statement was correct. 
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arguments are nowhere near as bad as ENAG makes them out to be. For instance, in the specific 
ordinary sense of ‘woman’ that I must have had in mind, premise P5 of the “swapped gender 
roles” argument is true. The problem would not then be with the argument, but with my 
unthinking assumption that, in the context of debating philosophers like Bettcher and Stoljar, all 
three of us are using ‘woman’ with the same ordinary meaning. Finally, on this interpretation 
WAHF’s cautionary advice about activist sloganeering (18) would still apply. We will have to 
leave this puzzle unresolved.19 
5. From semantics to metaphysics  
As discussed, Dembroff incorrectly characterizes the overall argument of WAHF’s section 2 as 
proceeding from semantic premises to a metaphysical conclusion. In ENAG’s mistaken 
reconstruction, section 2 of WAHF employs a crucial premise (“premise 6”) to bridge the gap 
between semantics and metaphysics, namely “that the “philosophically relevant” meaning of the 
term ‘woman’ is a reliable guide to the metaphysics of the category woman.” Section 3 of ENAG 
is dedicated to undermining premise 6. 
 Recall from section 2 that three of the six considerations in favor of AHF only appeal to non-
linguistic premises. Accordingly, they need no bridge between semantics and metaphysics. But 
the remaining three considerations do support AHF by directly supporting the semantic claim 
that ‘woman’ denotes adult human female. So if ENAG shows that premise 6 is false, that might 
seem to threaten at least some of my arguments. 
 On Dembroff’s telling, I have “failed to acknowledge, much less address” (ENAG: 10, fn. 
33) an argument from Barnes that “the semantics of natural language gender terms pull apart 
from the metaphysics of gender” (10). Even if we grant that ‘woman’ denotes adult human 
female, “the problem remains: one cannot read off the metaphysics of gender off “the meaning” 
of natural language terms” (9). 
 However, Barnes’s argument threatens nothing in WAHF (which does not use the phrase 
‘metaphysics of gender’). Indeed, one need only read the relevant paragraphs in ENAG to see 
 
19  Dembroff 2018 offers an argument against the “identity view of gender”, that “gender is just reproductive 
features and nothing more”. Whatever the identity view is, precisely, if Dembroff’s argument succeeds it also shows 
that AHF is false, with ‘adult’ interpreted non-socially, as in ‘adult chimpanzee’. (For an explanation of why the 
argument does not succeed, see Bogardus Forthcoming: 12-3.) So perhaps Dembroff’s view is that ‘woman’ often 
does denote adult human female, but only with a social interpretation of ‘adult’. But even that would partially 
vindicate WAHF. 
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that Barnes’s argument is irrelevant. Is Barnes denying elementary disquotational principles like 
‘If ‘p’ is true then p’?  No. But nothing more is involved in the step from “semantics” to 
“metaphysics”. This is how WAHF puts the step in the “dictionary” argument: 
Granted that the dictionary definition gives the meaning of ‘woman’, the 
intension of ‘woman’ at a world w is the set of adult human females in w, and 
AHF follows immediately. (4)20 
Here’s another way of putting the point. ENAG quotes Barnes approvingly, as urging that the 
“metaphysics of gender” requires understanding the “bedrock social structure” that gives rise to 
the “complicated, multi-faceted social experience of gender” (10; see Barnes 2019: 14.) It is 
certainly implausible that the semantics of ‘woman’ is going to be of much help with the 
metaphysics of gender in this Barnesian sense. But WAHF does not pretend otherwise. 
 ENAG continues with “another, largely undiscussed reason to think that natural language 
terms are a poor guide to the metaphysics of gender” (10). Given the point just made, this 
doesn’t look promising as an objection. But an argument against AHF is in the vicinity, so this 
can’t be passed over. 
According to Dembroff, “in many contexts” ‘woman and ‘man’ “operate as “floating 
signifiers”, which “lack stable extensions and are not primarily descriptive” (ENAG: 12). 
‘Floating signifier’ is a term from semiotics, and originated with the anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss: “somewhat like algebraic symbols [floating signifiers] occur to represent an 
indeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid of meaning and thus susceptible of receiving 
any meaning at all” (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 55). “Such signifiers mean different things to different 
people: they may signify many or even any signifieds; they may mean whatever their interpreters 
want them to mean” (Chandler 2017: 90).  
 If AHF is true then ‘woman’ and ‘lioness’ are both semantically very similar. On the 
reasonable assumption that ‘lioness’ is a semantically orthodox common noun, it is quite unlike 
 
20 Spelling the step out a little more, leaving off the universal quantifier and ignoring tense for simplicity: ‘S is a 
woman iff S is an adult human female’ is true at w iff the referent of ‘S’ in w is (i) a member of both the intension of 
‘woman’ and the intension of ‘adult human female’ in w, or (ii) is not a member of either. Since the intension of 
‘woman’ = the intension of ‘adult human female’, ‘S is a woman iff S is an adult human female’ is true at w. But 
this holds for all worlds w. So ‘S is a woman iff S is an adult human female’ true at every world; hence ‘Necessarily, 
S is a woman iff S is an adult human female’ is true. The step from “semantics to metaphysics” takes us to: 
necessarily, S is a woman iff S is an adult human female. That is, AHF is true. 
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any floating signifier. Therefore if ‘woman’ is a floating signifier tout court, with no senses akin 
to ‘lioness’, then AHF is not true. (Or, better: there is no such proposition as AHF to begin with.) 
 Granted that languages do contain floating signifiers, is it plausible that ‘woman’ is one of 
them? Lévi-Strauss apparently thought not. One of his examples is “when American slang says 
that a woman has got ‘oomph’” (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 55)—‘oomph’ is the floating signifier, not 
‘woman’. Much better candidates for floating signifiers are new coinages like ‘neutrois’, “a 
catch-all ‘gender neutral’ label that can mean different things to different people, such as 
agender, neither/nor, genderless and so on” (Wood 2018: 24; see also Reilly-Cooper 2016). 
 What’s more, the claim that ‘woman’ is a floating signifier tout court is incompatible with 
radical polysemy: polysemy is just quotidian meaning multiplied, whereas a floating signifier has 
no such meaning. It is fairly clear that Dembroff is claiming only that ‘woman’ is used as a 
floating signifier, “capable of taking on whatever descriptive content users wish to impose” 
(ENAG: 11), in some contexts, not all. These contexts are, roughly, ones where “social or 
political ends” (11) are important. Provided that these contexts are not operative when premises 
P1 to P6 are considered (section 2 above), the preliminary case for AHF is not in danger. 
Incidentally, WAHF does caution that politically charged contexts should be avoided (16). 
 What is the evidence that ‘woman’ and ‘man’ at least on occasion “operate as floating 
signifiers”? ENAG lacks the “space to fully argue for this claim” (11), but Dembroff does give 
one reason. Two people, perhaps a “conservative” and a “liberal”, can agree on the “underlying 
physical, psychological, and social facts, and still continue to make…opposing claims”—one 
says ‘S is a woman’, while the other says ‘No, S is a man’. “This suggests” that ‘woman’ and 
‘man’ are “doing normative political work more so than descriptive work”; the conservative and 
the liberal are not arguing, inter alia, “about the way the world is” (11). Dembroff’s argument 
deserves much more discussion than it is going to receive here, but its form is suspicious. 
Consider Burge’s Arthritis Man who falsely believes he has arthritis in his thigh (Burge 1979). 
Arthritis Man could agree with someone else on the “underlying” physical and psychological 
facts, and yet have a simple disagreement with an interlocutor about whether he has arthritis in 
his thigh. 
 This part of ENAG ends with an objection that repeats the incorrect claim about WAHF’s 
methodology: I do not “consider the possibility that one can theorize about the metaphysics of 
gender using methodologies other than the analysis of natural language use” (ENAG: 12). Oddly, 
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ENAG immediately goes on to note that I do mention Haslanger’s ameliorative project, while 
managing to incorrectly claim that I misrepresent it.21 ENAG also ignores the pessimistic 
remarks about the prospects for ameliorative projects at the end of WAHF. In any event, this is 
not an objection against the argument of the paper, but at best the complaint that there are other 
more interesting projects, which WAHF does not deny. 
6. Rebutting arguments against AHF 
As mentioned earlier, reinforcing the claim that AHF is the default hypothesis is not much of an 
achievement. (I suppose I can give myself a small pat on the back for apparently being the first 
philosopher in 2500 years to do this, though.) If WAHF contains anything of value, it is the 
rebuttal of the arguments against AHF, in section 3. After all, if AHF remains a live possibility, 
it would be a bad idea to lump ‘woman’ together with ‘genderqueer’ and ‘pangender’ as “gender 
terms”, as if they formed a unified class. The latter two words presumably pick out social 
categories of some kind, and certainly not biological ones. Current methodology in the 
metaphysics of gender is seriously misguided unless AHF can be taken off the table. 
 What, then, are ENAG’s objections to section 3? Strikingly, there do not appear to be any.22 
Perhaps Dembroff does not want to defend Bettcher’s and Stoljar’s arguments against AHF, but 
instead thinks that some other argument—radical polysemy, floating signifiers?—will do the job. 
Or perhaps Dembroff thinks AHF is true, albeit only in one relatively uninteresting sense of 
‘woman’. We will have to leave this puzzle unresolved too. 
7. Social and biological categories 
The conclusion of WAHF is not just that AHF is true; it is that “woman is a biological (and not 
social) category” (3). The paper simply asserts without argument that adult human female, “like 
the categories vertebrate, mammal” (2) is a biological category. The definition of ‘social 
category’ is borrowed from Haslanger; as Dembroff puts it, a social category has “membership 
conditions that are at least partly constituted by social features” (ENAG: 14). Putting it more 
 
21 According to Dembroff, I present the ameliorative project as “largely disinterested in describing the world”; a 
glance at the relevant paragraph (WAHF: 4) shows that this is incorrect. I even quote Haslanger saying that the goal 
is partly one of understanding—there can be no understanding without correct description. 
22 This may be a bit unfair. Dembroff does say in a footnote that my response to Bettcher’s gender role reversal case 
is simply to “stipulate” that I’m right (ENAG: 8, fn. 27), which seems intended as an objection. In any event, the 
claim of stipulation is incorrect.  
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plainly, in order to belong to the categories Yale University professor, celebrity, or godparent, a 
person needs to be embedded in a society of some sort; these are accordingly social categories.23  
WAHF also gives no direct argument for the claim that adult human female is not social.24 A 
footnote in WAHF says that while some have argued “that categories like female are social 
categories…[t]his position is assumed false here”, with a citation to an article of mine written for 
a popular audience (Byrne 2018).25 
ENAG finds all this immensely problematic, a regrettable result of my ignorance or 
misunderstanding of “relevant work in social ontology, the history of sexology, gender theory, 
and biomedical anthropology” (ENAG: 14). After exhibiting my purported confusions, Dembroff 
sums up: 
(A) Byrne’s stipulated distinction between the “biological” and the “social” 
fails to show that they are exclusive, (B) fails to undermine the traditional 
sex/gender distinction, and (C) fails to show that sex categories are not, in the 
relevant and interesting sense, social categories. (19; labels added) 
ENAG spends pages agonizing over what I could possibly have meant by ‘social’ and 
‘biological’. Let me try to explain why this was unnecessary. WAHF begins by noting that the 
orthodox view in the philosophical literature on gender “is that the category woman is a social 
category, like the categories wife, firefighter, and shoplifter” (1-2). As Barnes says, theorists of 
categories like woman can be divided: 
…into two main camps: those who say that your gender is determined 
primarily by how other people react to you, and those who say that your gender 
 
23 There is a very subtle issue here about the relation between the modal characterization of “social category” given 
in WAHF and a characterization like Dembroff’s, although there is no need to go into it. WAHF obliquely alluded to 
this in fn. 2 with a reference to Haslanger 2012: 131 (the modal version) and 87 (a more Dembroffian 
characterization). 
24 However, an argument is given that “‘woman’ does not pick out a social category” (WAHF: 5). 
25 Dembroff agrees that “on the very narrow view of a “social” category that Byrne uses, it is true that sex categories 
are not social” (ENAG: 16). But: the claim of “gender scholars…was never and is not the claim that the membership 
conditions of sex categories include constitutively societal features” (16, first emphasis added). If so, then the four 
examples I give in fn. 7 are all wrong. Admittedly the first three of the four are sometimes hard to interpret, but the 
fourth is perfectly clear: “Being of a certain sex” “is not a biological property”, it “is an institutional property, in fact 
a legal one…a conferred legal status” (Ásta 2018: 70, 71-2). 
 An accompanying footnote wonders how I can say that “if female is a social category” (WAHF: 3, fn. 7) then 
“[my] thesis is easier to defend”, given that “[Byrne’s] thesis is, in their own words, the thesis that “woman is a 
biological (and not social) category”” (ENAG, 16, fn. 58). The answer is in the full quotation from WAHF 
(emphasis changed): “if female is a social category then AHF is easier to defend”.  
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is determined primarily by your own internal sense of yourself. Let’s call the 
former externalists (since they think your gender is primarily determined by 
things external to you) about gender and the latter internalists about gender 
(since they think your gender is determined primarily by things internal to 
you). (Barnes 2018: 585; emphasis added) 
Gender externalists hold that woman is a social category in the loose and intuitive sense 
illustrated by the examples just before this quotation. The situation might seem different with 
internalists, because society is an external matter. But internalism requires society just as much 
as externalism. The pertinent “internal sense of yourself”, or your “gender identity”, involves: 
…your internally felt sense of your relationship to the gender norms and 
categories that are common within our society. (Barnes 2018: 587-8) 
The category adult human female is clearly not social in the loose and intuitive sense in which 
theorists of gender hold that woman is a social category. Any way of making this loose and 
intuitive sense more precise will yield the same result, which is why WAHF did not bother 
trying. Adult human females are usually found in societies, but they need not be; neither need 
they have the right sort of “internal sense” of themselves, or indeed any sense of themselves at 
all.26  
 Hence, if AHF is true, woman is not a social category, and orthodoxy is wrong. What sort of 
category is it, then? It’s helpful, although not mandatory, to say something at this point. And 
since biologists take a special interest in sex across the animal and vegetable kingdoms, the 
juvenile and adult forms of organisms, and species, the obvious term is ‘biological’. As Stoljar 
puts it: 
There is only one plausible biological type that is a candidate for the species of 
woman: the type “[adult] female human being.” (Stoljar 1995: 267, quoted in 
WAHF: 9; emphasis added) 
No general characterization of a biological category is necessary. ‘Biological’ could even be 
dropped in favor of ‘non-social’ and WAHF would be in all essentials unchanged. Dembroff’s 
(A)-complaint, that I have failed to show that the biological and the social are “exclusive”, is 
 
26 This is another small piece of evidence in AHF’s favor—women can lack a mental life entirely, due to traumatic 
brain injury. Cf. Barnes on Haslanger’s example of “cognitively disabled women” (Barnes 2018: 589; 2019: 7-8).   
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therefore misdirected. All that matters is that adult human female is non-social in the relevant 
sense, no matter how ‘social’ is precisified. 
 Before getting on to (B), I should correct a mistake that occurs in the course of Dembroff’s 
discussion of (A), namely that I “insist”: 
…that persons who lack uteruses and ovaries, even if they otherwise appear as 
“normal” females, are not adult human females. (ENAG: 15) 
So supposedly on my view, one way to become a non-woman is to have a hysterectomy  
and an oophorectomy, which doesn’t sound right! Possibly Dembroff has misunderstood my 
“Complete Asexual Syndrome” example (WAHF: 11). The necessary corrective is right there in 
WAHF: “Women can lack “female reproductive organs” due to birth defects or surgery” (9, fn. 
14). 
 The (B) item on ENAG’s rap sheet is that I have “set out to disprove” “the traditional 
sex/gender distinction”, to no avail. Somewhat puzzlingly, according to Dembroff I in effect 
make something like this traditional distinction myself, “albeit in a confused way”, when I say 
that the categories female and male are both biological and “socially significant” (WAHF: 5). 
(Dembroff never explains why this is confused.) 
 Here is an early version of the sex/gender distinction, from the British sociologist Ann 
Oakley: 
[There is] a crucial distinction it is necessary to make in our thinking about 
male and female roles—the distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. ‘Sex’ is a 
word that refers to the biological differences between male and female: the 
visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative function. 
‘Gender’ however is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification 
into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. (Oakley 1972: 21-2)27  
There is surely a distinction here, so setting out to “disprove” it is bound to end in tears. I had no 
such quixotic ambition, and there is no hint to the contrary in WAHF. What I did set out to 
disprove was another version of the sex/gender distinction, the one prevalent in contemporary 
 
27 Oakley took this distinction from the UCLA psychiatrist Robert Stoller (Stoller 1968). 
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philosophy, on which there is a distinction between “human females and males” and “women 
and men” (WAHF: 2, quoting Mikkola 2016: 23).28 
The (B) charge is incorrect, then. What about (C), the complaint that I have failed “to show 
that sex categories are not, in the relevant and interesting sense, social categories” (19)? WAHF 
already makes the (obvious) point that female and male are socially significant categories. This is 
undeniably interesting. It is also undeniably irrelevant to the aims of WAHF. So what is the 
problem supposed to be? It seems to be this. ENAG’s discussion of (C) leads to something that 
does look like an objection. According to Dembroff, I take: 
(A*) adult human female and adult human male to be universal, stable, and 
discrete categories of sex traits, where (B*) a single set of sex traits are shared 
among all women, and where (C*) these categories can be explained without 
reference to cultural ideologies. (ENAG: 17, labels added) 
Unfortunately for me, “Each of these claims is false” (17). I am not completely sure what 
everything in this quoted passage means, but for safety’s sake it should not go unexamined. 
 Dembroff begins the argument by trying to establish the falsity of (A*): “there are no such 
stable, discrete, and exhaustive categories of sex traits” like adult human female. (Presumably 
‘exhaustive’ is supposed to be equivalent to ‘universal’; why Dembroff thinks adult human 
female is a sex trait rather than a developmental or species trait is obscure.) A quotation from the 
historian Joanne Meyerowitz is supposed to “[make] this point clearly” (ENAG: 17). But the 
quotation simply says that accounts of “biological sex” have varied widely over human history. 
The details are fascinating, but the basic idea applies to almost anything that humans have been 
talking and thinking about for millennia, like water, lightning, and the heavens. To put 
Meyerowitz’s point more whiggishly, we know vastly more about sex than Aristotle. The only 
thing that changed was our knowledge and beliefs about sex, not sex itself. (If Dembroff intends 
to be using ‘category’ in the sense it has in WAHF, categories are anyway not the kind of thing 
that can be “stable” or “unstable”.) 
 The subsequent paragraph of ENAG appeals to Meyerowitz again: “sexologists turned from 
“the visible realm of genitals to the microscopic gaze” to embark on a still ongoing “elusive 
 
28 This version of the sex/gender distinction can be found in Oakely too (1972: 115). For a recent paper devoted 
entirely to it, see Bogardus Forthcoming. 
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quest” to find stable grounds for binary, exhaustive sex categorization” (17; quotes within the 
quotation from Meyerowitz 2009: 2). (Never mind that Meyerowitz is more charitably 
interpreted as talking about biomedical scientists, not “sexologists”.) The paragraph also 
mentions that “the International Olympic Committee stipulated categories of “sport sex”” 
(ENAG: 17); naturally, in different social conditions the IOC might have stipulated differently. 
Dembroff erroneously concludes that no “single, fixed category answers to “the” category adult 
human female”. The IOC’s task is to determine who counts as female for the purposes of fair 
competition, while taking into account the interests of all parties. That is by no means the same 
as determining who is female. 
 Next, ENAG tries to establish (B*), that there is no single “sex trait” that all women share. 
Since adult human female is taken to be a “sex trait”, if (B*) is correct AHF is false. In support 
of (B*) Dembroff quotes an impressionistic passage from Katrina Karkazis, a biomedical 
anthropologist. According to Karkazis, “If [biological traits M and F] were understood as the 
essence of sex [male and female, respectively], women…who had [factor M but not F] were 
men. This didn’t make sense, so scientists proposed yet other traits” (Karkazis 2019: 1898). That 
seems quite sensible!29 The problem is supposedly that the other traits were no better; as 
Dembroff puts it, “a century-long search for such traits has come up empty” (ENAG: 18).  
 The quoted passage does not actually support (B*), that not even the “sex trait” adult human 
female is common to all women. Instead, what it does support is something quite different, that 
(in Karkazis’s phrase) there is no “single, definitive biological indicator” of sex. That is, 
scientists have been searching for something that unifies the females, and something else that 
unifies the males, and all the plausible candidates have been found wanting. Female and male 
have turned out to be like tree (Dupré 1981) or bug in the “small insect-like creature” sense, 
superficial folk categories that biologists have little theoretical use for. Pretend that is right. Does 
it show that AHF is false? No: AHF says nothing about whether female cuts nature at the joints. 
Does it show that woman is a social category? No: tree and bug are not social categories. Does it 
 
29 The full quotation is this: “If gonads were understood as the essence of sex, women who were phenotypically 
female but who had testes were men. This seemed illogical, so scientists proposed yet other traits.” It is not clear 
what “scientists” Karkazis is referring to. She may have in mind the early twentieth century British gynaecologist 
Blair Bell (Dreger 1998: 158-66; cited in Karkazis 2008: 40). In any case, the quotation gives a somewhat 
misleading impression of consensus (see, e.g., Money 1955: 254; Hammar et al. 1980: 458). 
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show that female is not a biological category in the very demanding sense in which tree and bug 
are not biological categories? Yes, but as noted above, that is not the issue. 
 As to (C*), that categories of “sex traits” cannot “be explained without reference to cultural 
ideologies”, ENAG does not “rehash the many detailed arguments”, gesturing instead at a 
“plethora of books and articles”. (I completely agree with the claim of quantity.30) We need not 
investigate this further, but it is worth noting that ENAG’s citations have a curious omission. 
Biomedical anthropology is a worthy discipline, no doubt, but what about biology? If you want 
to know what sex is, why not consult a few works by biologists (e.g. Roughgarden 2004: 26, 
Parker 2011, Beukeboom and Perrin 2014: ch. 1, Futuyama and Kirkpatrick 2017: 249), or 
philosophers of biology (Dupré 1995: ch. 3, Franklin-Hall Forthcoming, Khalidi Forthcoming)? 
Just a suggestion. 
8. Motives 
Finally, we reach the last part of ENAG. In accordance with the new norms of scholarship that 
Dembroff seems to be following, the hidden motives of the present writer are exposed to the 
light. The “larger methodological and ethical problems” (19-20) of WAHF are scrutinized. The 
rhetorical needle of the previous sections, already quivering around 10, is ramped up to 11. 
 The larger problems are these: I assume that “there are two universal genders, every person 
immutably has one, and all this is vindicated by science”. I “cite the testimony of trans persons 
only for the purpose of undermining these persons’ self-understanding, or for pitting them 
against other trans persons”. I “sweepingly dismiss cultures with nonbinary gender systems in a 
footnote.” I “conjure a fictional intersex variation for the purpose of arguing that, no matter how 
much an intersex person looks, behaves, or claims to be a woman, they are not one” (ENAG: 
20). 
 I am afraid I have already have overused ‘incorrect’, but let me stick to the word for 
uniformity. All these claims are incorrect. (One caveat: I am not sure what Dembroff means by 
the phrase ‘universal gender’.) My reasons for citing the testimony of transgender women are 
right on the surface (WAHF: 16-7). The pertinent footnote contains no dismissal of cultures with 
 
30 Cf. Karkazis: “sex…is culturally contingent…[it] is not a static, discrete, or even strictly biological characteristic 
that exists prior to the relations and practices that produce it” (2019: 1898). This is a representative indication of the 
quality of Dembroff’s sources. 
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a “third gender” (10, fn. 16); a thousand genders can bloom, as far as WAHF is concerned.31 I 
make use of a fictional case of a person who is neither male nor female for reasons that are also 
on the surface (11).32 The contrary charges are an artefact of Dembroff’s hermeneutical approach 
of reading between the lines rather than actually reading the lines. I should perhaps emphasize 
that I have absolutely no interest in gratuitously dragging transgender people or people with 
DSDs33 into philosophical arguments. They figure in WAHF only because some of my 
opponents’ arguments appeal to them.34 
 Dembroff ends by confidently proclaiming that I am trying to vindicate a political slogan, 
‘Women are adult human females’. Evidently the allegation is that I am in sympathy with the 
aims of an “anti-trans” movement (ENAG: 1, 2). In a footnote, Dembroff says that it is 
“particularly obvious that Byrne is defending a political slogan” (7, fn. 23; emphasis added), 
apparently on the ground that the Oxford English Dictionary entry does not contain ‘adult human 
female’. (Merriam-Websters is also given as another example.) Instead, the OED entry is ‘adult 
female human being’, although the footnote does not mention that. Dembroff’s reasoning is not 
explicit, but might be this: the obvious explanation of why I chose ‘adult human female’ instead 
of ‘adult female human’ is that I intended to signal my support of those who deploy ‘Woman are 
adult human females’ to “undermine civic rights and respect for trans persons” (ENAG: 20). 
 After all, what other explanation could there possibly be? Well, WAHF does say that an 
“eminently desirable and feasible goal is for trans women (and men) to be accepted by society 
and live in peace and dignity” (18). And ‘adult human female’ is a perfectly ordinary phrase. It 
gets more significantly more hits on Google than ‘adult female human’, restricting the search to 
 
31 About that footnote, Dembroff writes: “Byrne appeals to linguistic translation (from a language with nonbinary 
gender terms to one with only binary gender terms) to undermine the legitimacy of nonbinary categories” (ENAG: 
14, fn. 16). I do not know what Dembroff means by ‘legitimate’, or why the footnote is said to use “cherry-picked 
quotations”, but there is a hint that the translations aren’t accurate because English has “only binary gender terms” , 
or at least not a rich enough stock of non-binary gender terms (‘nonbinary’ is a word of English). Consider one third 
gender I mention, the Samoan fa’afafine. According Paul Vasey (an expert who has studied the fa’afafine for many 
years), “Translated literally, fa’afafine means ‘in the manner of a woman’” (Vasey and Bartlett 2007: 484). Is Vasey 
wrong about that? If he isn’t, why think there is an insuperable obstacle to translation elsewhere? 
32 Taken literally, Dembroff is attributing to me the insane view that no person with an intersex condition who 
claims to be a woman is one. It is possible that Dembroff has been misled by the ‘intersex’ terminology, but this is 
speculation on my part. 
33 Disorders of Sex Development. See Lee et al. 2016.  
34 As WAHF recounts, feminist philosophers have taken a keen interest in transsexuality (11). 
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the period before it became part of a slogan. It is also Google’s own definition of ‘woman’.35 In 
any case, can it seriously be imagined that I would have been let off the hook if I had reversed 
‘human’ and ‘female’? One could equally well argue that I chose the alternative formulation to 
give myself plausible deniability.36  
 According to ENAG’s abstract, ‘Women are adult human females’ appears on “billboards, 
pamphlets, and anti-trans online forums”, but no citations are provided describing where this 
occurred, or why. Later the sentence is said to be associated with “conservative groups” (ENAG: 
11). To my knowledge, ‘Woman are adult human females’ has appeared on no billboard. 
However, ‘woman wʊmən noun adult human female’ was a billboard slogan in the UK after the 
government proposed reforms to the 2004 Gender Recognition Act, so this must be the political 
context to which Dembroff is alluding.37 
 Some corrections are needed. It was the center-right Conservative government under Prime 
Minister Theresa May which proposed to change the GRA; this would have made it considerably 
easier for transgender people to be legally recognized as their “acquired gender”. A government 
consultation document was published in July 2018, and opposition came from various grassroots 
women’s groups, with significant representation from the trade union and labour movement. 
What is now the main group, Woman’s Place UK, did not adopt the dictionary slogan. Two 
billboards displaying it were put up by the founder of another group, Standing for Women, in 
September and October of 2018; the first was quickly taken down by the billboard company and 
the second, incongruously placed above a sex shop, had little impact. (The dictionary slogan also 
appeared on T-shirts, stickers, and postcards.) There is no doubt that the slogan and its relatives 
are sometimes wielded by those with ill-will towards transgender people, but they are also used 
by those who agree with the Telegraph journalist Diana Thomas: “The rightful struggle for 
 
35 ‘Adult human female’ first appears in drafts from which WAHF was derived in early 2017. (I had also consulted 
the OED entry, but attached no significance to the difference in wording.) The slogan (in its dictionary version—see 
below) did not begin to catch on until later in 2018. 
36 Moreover, radical feminists sometimes use the alternative, as well as ‘female adult human’ (Beck 2018). 
37 Neither the dictionary slogan nor ‘Women are adult human females’ has gained traction in the US. In 2019 the 
socially conservative Heritage Foundation hosted a critical discussion about the US Equality Act, which would add 
gender identity to the list of federally protected characteristics. The panel was moderated by Ryan T. Anderson, a 
devout Catholic and opponent of same-sex marriage, and featured members of the Women’s Liberation Front 
(WoLF), a group of radical feminists “Dedicated to the total liberation of women”. The WoLF website 
(womensliberationfront.org) has some scattered textual occurrences of ‘wom(e/a)n’ combined with ‘adult human 
female(s)” but none of ‘Women are adult human females’ or the dictionary slogan, and Anderson’s book When 
Harry Became Sally: responding to the transgender moment (Anderson 2018) does not contain ‘adult human 
female(s)’ (or ‘adult female human(s)’). 
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recognition and respect for our identity should not require everyone else to redefine their entire 
concept of what it means to be male or female” (Thomas 2019b; see section 3 above). I am sure 
that the socialist feminists Linda Bellos (Heuchan 2017), and Lucy Masoud (Masoud 2018) 
would be surprised to discover that they are part of a vast right-wing conspiracy. The point is not 
to pick sides. But if one is going to pick sides, it is important to characterize the sides 
correctly.38,39 
* * * 
To sum up, Dembroff’s reply leaves the arguments of WAHF untouched. What it says about the 







38 For those interested in learning more about the UK context, I recommend a series of articles in The Economist, 
featuring a variety of perspectives (Joyce 2018), James Kirkup’s articles in The Spectator (e.g. Kirkup 2018), and an 
interview with the YouTuber (and transgender woman), Rose of Dawn (Foster et al. 2019). 
39 In 2019 the employment contract of a UK tax expert, Maya Forstater, was not renewed because of Forstater’s 
expressed views on the gender debate (see Stock 2019). ‘Woman are adult human females’ appears in Forstater’s 
testimony to an employment tribunal (Forstater 2019). Citing this testimony, Dembroff claims that “a number of 
high-profile court briefing[s] opposing trans rights in both the US and the UK cite blog posts by philosophers such 
as Kathleen Stock and Alex Byrne as evidence that trans persons are dangerous and deluded” (Dembroff 
Forthcoming-a, emphasis added). As can readily be checked by following the link that Dembroff supplies and 
searching for ‘Stock’ and ‘Byrne’, the citations are not to blog posts and (like Forstater’s testimony as a whole) have 
absolutely nothing to do with the emphasized phrase. 
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